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Concession implies causality, though in some
other space
Arie Verhagen
This paper addresses the issue of the relationship between concessivity and
causality, in the sense that these concepts can and should be construed äs
parallel, concessivity being in some sense a negative counterpart of
causality. It is argued that in order to avoid the risk of internal contradiction
and other conceptual problems, it is necessary to construe the relationship in
terms of partly but not completely similar 'points of view', or mental
spaces. While aiming for an explanation of obvious facts of Interpretation
and usage, the discussion focuses on clarification of conceptual questions.
1. Introduction
It is well known, äs noted by König and Siemund (this volume), that
causal and concessive relations and the linguistic means for marking
them are conceptually related in interesting ways. Theoretical analyses
of these relations should therefore provide explanations for this
connection. The kind of phenomena König and Siemund draw attention
to involve, inter alia, a parallelism in the possible interpretations of
sentences such äs the following:
(1) The house is no less comfortable because it dispenses with air-
conditioning.
(2) The house is no less comfortable, although it dispenses with air-
conditioning.
Especially if realized with a particular Intonation contour, (1) can be
read äs a paraphrase of (2): with the negation taking wide scope,
including the causal clause, (1) can express the same relationship äs (2)
with the negation taking narrow scope, excluding the concessive clause.
Roughly: denying "the house is less comfortable because it dispenses
with air-conditioning" can be equivalent to stating "it is no less
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comfortable" while concedmg "it dispenses with air-conditiomng"
Even if one doubts the equivalence of (1) and (2) m all circumstances,
the fact that for certam purposes or m certam respects they can be taken
äs parallels suffices to estabhsh an mteresting connection between
concessivity, causahty, and negation, one which poses a cntenon of
adequacy for theones of concessivity
Konig (1991) explores the idea that this connection might be
captured in a very direct way, viz by considermg it an instance of
duality As already pomted out at the end of that paper, there appear to
be some fundamental problems for this approach äs soon äs one goes
beyond the very first examples that inspired it (cf also section 3 of
Konig and Siemund (this volume)) One of the problems is the
asymmetry in the relationship Negation of causahty may lead to an
Interpretation äs concessive, but (wide scope) negation of concessivity
does not allow for an Interpretation äs causahty It is not the case that
John faüed his exams although he worked hard cannot be interpreted äs
"John passed his exams because he worked hard"—if it is interpretable
at all Another issue is that in this way the relationship can at best be
stipulated, not explamed It is evident that only a wide scope
Interpretation of a negation of causahty can correspond to a concessive
readmg, but why should this constramt hold m precisely this way*? All in
all, it seems unavoidable to conclude that concession cannot be taken äs
negated causahty in any simple sense However, this should not lead to
the conclusion that the original observaüon was misguided—the parallel
between causality and concessivity still requires an explanation
In fact, there is yet another set of mteresting connections between
causality and concessivity (or more generally contrast), viz the fact
that they can be applied m parallel ways in different conceptual domams
m the sense of Sweetser (1990) Interestingly, it is also true that this
theory at some point runs into the same problem that the parallel is not
complete, and that it is not obvious whether the difference can be
accounted for in a prmcipled manner It is this connection that I will use
äs a starting point for an alternative analysis of the relationship between
causality and concessivity
2. Causals and concessives in two domains
One of the main motives for Sweetser's domain distinction is that it
provides a mechanism for accounting for the fact that sirmlar types of
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polysemy show up m different expressions Consider the ambiguity of
modal verbs in terms of deonüc vs epistemic mterpretations He must
come hörne is an example of deontic usage, it descnbes some Obligation
in the world (viz in the person referred to) He must be home (by now)
illustrates epistemic usage, it locates an Obligation (viz to conclude "He
is home" on the basis of the available evidence) in the conceptuahzer
rather than in the world being conceptualized It is no comcidence that
this type of polysemy resembles the difference between distmct types of
usage of the English conjunction because, äs exemplified m the contrast
between (3) and (4)
(3) John passed his exams because he worked hard
(4) John worked hard, because he passed his exams
In (3), the causal relation holds between the facts that John passed his
exams and that he worked hard (i e in the "content domam") In (4), on
the other hand, it holds in the conceptuahzer's mind, i e the proposition
that John worked hard is epistemically caused by an argument based on
the knowledge that he passed his exams Postulatmg a systematic
conceptual distmcüon between content and epistemic domams for the
application of the meaning of modal verbs äs well äs connectives
provides a umfied account for such phenomena, and thus has great
explanatory power
At first sight, Sweetser's approach is further corroborated by the fact
that it also applies to connectives with some negative aspect of meaning,
i e concessives However, precisely this application also produces a
conceptual dilemma, äs we shall see
On the one hand, cases hke (5) and (6) seem to be clear negative
parallels to (3) and (4)
(5) John did notpass his exams although he worked hard
(6) John did not work hard, although he passed his exams
Intuitively, one could say that in (5) the real-world causal connection
between passing exams and working hard is in some sense negated, so
that this would be a case of concession in the content domain
Analogously, what is negated in (6) seems to be the vahdity (in this
case) of the inference from the knowledge of John's passing his exams
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to the conclusion of bis workmg hard, so that this would be a case of
concession in the epistemic domam (cf the examples and paraphrases of
'adversative' conjunctions in Sweetser 1990 79) Thus what we have
here is another mterestmg connection between causahty and
concessivity if the latter is the negative counterpart of the former, then,
given the theory of domains, we should expect it to be apphcable in a
parallel fashion in the distmct domains, and this is precisely what
appears to be the case
On the other hand, Sweetser explicitly draws attention to the fact that
for the adversative conjunction but (arguably even more general and
semantically simpler than concessive although), it is hard to find clear
examples of content usages The point is that a contrastive relation
always allows for a construal äs a relation of reasomng, mvolving
relations between arguments and conclusions, and is never clearly
restncted to real-world relations Consider the following parallel to the
concessive examples above
(7) John worked hard, but he did notpass his exams
The contrast signalled by but cannot be sufficiently explamed in terms
of the real world facts of workmg hard and not passing, after all, these
situations are not at all incompatible m the real world, äs is clear from
the fact that they co-occur quite regularly In Order to explain the
contrast it seems necessary to mvoke, among other thmgs, some
reasomng process on the basis of general and specific knowledge
hcensmg the expectation that John could pass his exams, so that the
contrast can be construed äs holding between this expectation and the
actual fact of John's failing
In a way, such a move even seems natural in some general sense, äs
it is actually not really clear what the content of the concept of 'contrast'
should be if we were to try to locate it completely in the world, i e
without reference to some person perceivmg or conceptualizmg a
contrast (Sweetser 1990 103-104) However, such a move does create a
dilemma If we call the use of but inherently epistemic (acknowledging
that the concept 'contrast' requires reference to reasomng), then we
would seem obliged to call although inherently epistemic äs well,
because this also mvolves contrast (5) is äs contrastive äs (7), and it
does in fact seem to require reference to the same kind of (unfulfilled)
expectations But callmg all uses of although epistemic would deprive
us of a way to account for the difference between (5) and (6), äs well äs
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for the parallel between this pair on the one band, and (3) and (4) on the
other.
My purpose in the remainder of this paper is to argue that the effects
previously analyzed in terms of domains can and should be derived
from the construction of mental spaces, with (especially) negative
semantic elements taken äs instructions for setting up alternative mental
spaces, and that precisely this reconstruction avoids the dilemma just
noted. More exactly, an approach using mental spaces, äs dynamically
constructed domains for the Interpretation of linguistic elements, allows
us to simultaneously (a) account for the parallel between (3)/(4) and
(5)/(6), (b) claim that contrastive—äs opposed to causal—relations
necessarily involve reference to some reasoning process, and (c)
account for the connection between concessivity and (negated)
causality.
3. Elements of a solution
Let me begin by illustrating the idea with the relatively simple example
(5), repeated here for convenience:
(5) John did notpass his exams although he worked hard.
As is well established in the literature on concessives, the specific
nature of such a relation crucially involves the fact, äs König (1991)
described it, that two propositions are asserted "against the background
of an assumption."1 Analyses explicating this idea in terms of logical
operators have been undertaken by Pasch (1992a, 1992b, 1994:16-27)
and König (1991, 1994), among others. There are differences among
these analyses, but the general idea is äs follows:
(8) "p although q" means:
a. Truth conditions: p & q
b. Presupposition: q -+ -p
Taken at face value this leads to an internal contradiction (implying both
p and -p, or both q and ~iq)? and is thus minimally in need of additional
mechanisms or assumptions. Pasch, acknowledging this, seems to
assume that a Speaker of anything of the form (8) actually utters
something that is necessarily false. Others are clearly more hesitant to
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draw such a conclusion. In any case, what seems to be needed is to be
more clear about what exactly is meant by the idea of "background
assumption", "discourse presupposition", or whatever it is called (cf.
König 1991). It is precisely at this crucial point that Mental Space
theory (Fauconnier 1994, 1998; Fauconnier & Sweetser (eds.) 1996) can
offer clarification, in a very natural way. Put informally, the way we
Interpret (5) is that the Speaker, working with some general rule
licensing certain inferences (in this case for example "Normally,
working hard increases your chances of passing" or "The harder you
work, the likelier it is that you will pass your exams", and their
corollaries), reports her knowledge of a particular Situation that may be
judged to satisfy the criteria for application of the rule, but nevertheless
does not conform to it. In Mental Space terms: the Speaker makes us set
up a 'point of view' in which a general rule, or "topos" (cf. note 1),
holds of the form {P-+Q} (the capital letters indicate that the
propositions involved are generalizations, not particulars). Furthermore,
in this mental space not only the general topos holds, but also some
particular proposition p, which counts äs an instance of P.
Consequently, within this mental space, the topos combined with p
licenses a causal inference, viz. of another particular proposition q.2
Represented graphically:
p: "John worked hard"
q: "He passed his exams"
Figur-e L Single Mental Space configuration
However, understanding the concessivity ofJohn did not pass his exams
although he worked hard involves understanding that such a mental
space is to be set up äs a second space projected from the Speaker's
actual mental space. By uttering although p the Speaker instructs the
hearer to set up two similar but distinct mental spaces in which p is true;
in one (Spacei, with the same structure äs in Figure l, but now projected
from the Speaker's own mental space) the causal inference "p therefore
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q" is valid, while in the Speaker's mental space (Spaceo), the truth of q is
denied so that this causal inference is not valid. Represented
graphically:
Spacej Space0
p: "John worked hard'1
q: "He passed his exams"
Figure 2. Elementary Mental Space configuration for concessivity
This analysis provides an immediate account, in a natural way, for the
often noted close relationship between concessivity and causality
without the problems involved in 'mixing' them in one System of
representation. It seems to capture a crucial feature of the concept of
concession: someone acknowledges that in highly similar circumstances
a mind very similar to one's own draws a valid causal inference, while
this inference is actually not valid.
The representation in Figure 2 uses the Standard apparatus of Mental
Space theory, especially connectors across spaces (the lines connecting
elements in one space to another). It includes the idea that Information
may get mapped from one space to another without explicit specific
instruction (cf. Fauconnier 1998). In particular, the topos {P^Q} may
transfer from Spacei (in which it is necessary äs licensor of the causal
inference) to Spaceo 'for free': one would normally Interpret the Speaker
äs still adhering to the idea that hard work ordinarily increases the
chances of passing (considering this particular case an exception to the
rule). But strictly speaking this Interpretation is optional (hence the
parentheses in Space0 in Figure 2); it may be cancelled, for instance,
when the Speaker goes on to construe her observation äs an argument
against the general assumption (äs in: Although he worked hard, John
failed the exam; so you see that you are wrong in suggesting that
working hard leads to success). In such a case, she still evokes a mental
space in which the topos and the related causal inference hold, but then
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the topos is explicitly excluded from the Speaker's own space. In any
case, the topos is neither necessarily entailed nor contradicted -within
Spaceo, something that is very hard to capture without distinguishing
between the two spaces.
4. Excursion: mental spaces and multiple voices
I just characterized concession äs envisaging another mind, similar to
one's own, drawing a causal inference that is valid in highly similar
circumstances but not in actuality. This formulation suggests a parallel
to another approach to the analysis of 'viewpoints' in a discourse, viz.
Ducrot's theory of "polyphony" (Ducrot 1984, 1996). The concepts of
mental spaces, äs I have so far used the term, and Ducrot's concept of
multiple 'voices' being present in the Interpretation of a single
utterance, may be seen äs no more than different labels for what is
essentially the same fundamental insight. To an important extent, I do in
fact believe this to be true. However, there are some differences that one
should be aware of.
First, the term "mental spaces" seems to put more emphasis on an
individual's mental capacity for entertaining different viewpoints,
whereas "multiple voices" more strongly evokes the inherent dialogic
nature of verbal communication. At this point I actually see no
incompatibility; the individual's capacity can be seen äs something that
is put to use in actual linguistic communication (when the abstract
mental spaces are assigned to the minds of actual people, äs it were), äs
well äs something that has emerged in the individual äs a result of
interaction with actual other persons during childhood. In other words,
though much may still be unknown about the empirical issue of the
precise relationship between individual and social cognition and the
ways they develop, there does not seem to be an a priori conceptual
Opposition between mental spaces and polyphony.
Second, Ducrot distinguishes between three specific types of voices
in an utterance, especially (1) physical producers of pieces of discourse,
(2) 'locutors' (those who may be held responsible for the content of the
utterance, and who do not necessarily coincide with the physical
producers; I will designate these äs 'conceptualizers' below), and (3)
'enunciators' (those whose viewpoints are represented in the discourse).
I do not know of an explicit parallel to these distinctions in mental space
terms. Something that is conceivably parallel to the distinction between
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the latter two notions will turn out to be relevant for the discussion
below, but I think it is an immediate consequence of other features of
the analysis and does not require independent stipulation.
Third, Ducrot's concept of polyphony is intimately linked to his
theory of argumentativity in natural language. At this point I think there
is both a real difference between the mental space and the polyphony
approaches, and a point where Mental Space theory can profitably be
augmented, if we take 'argumentation' not so much in the sense of
verbal confiict, but more in the sense of 'trying to influence a person's
point of view', Orienting one's addressee(s) towards some conclusion'.
I think this notion of argumentative Orientation' (in my view more
important for linguistic analysis than the notion of argumentation in
itself) is very useful, and can help us to see how mental spaces work in
certain areas (such äs scalar semantics, or certain phenomena of
language change). Still, for the purposes of the analysis of discourse äs
such, the mental space terminology seems to me to involve the
minimum of necessary assumptions concerning the nature of discourse
Interpretation. Analysts will agree, I assume, that any approach to
discourse Interpretation has to take into account that people can manage
multiple viewpoints simultaneously, whereas the question if these are
'better' viewed äs individual psychological phenomena or äs dialogic,
social ones, requires more specific assumptions and evidence. This is
the reason why I prefer to use the mental space terminology here. But
let us retum to the main theme now.
5. Solving the paradox
5.1. Epistemic causaHty
Setting up two related but distinct mental spaces in the construction of a
concessive relationship is crucial in avoiding the attribution of
contradictory beliefs to the conceptualizer of a concessive utterance, äs
seems unavoidable in an analysis that tries to analyze concessivity only
in terms of manipulations of propositions (cf. the beginning of section
2).3 Another interesting feature of the mental space approach is that the
same apparatus holds some promises for the analysis of (concessive)
conditionals and counterfactuals (cf. IfJohn had worked hard, he would
have passed or Even if John had worked hard, he would not have
passed) and thus for an account of the similarities (äs well äs the
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differences) between these kinds of relations and concessives.4 But in
the present context it is especially relevant that the idea of levels of
Interpretation can be reconstructed, at least partly, in terms of mental
spaces: whenever the Interpretation of a discourse relation (or a
connective) between two Segments involves the construction of two
similar mental spaces such that certain inferences are valid in one but
not in the other, then this Interpretation is necessarily epistemic. What
makes an example like (5) look like a case of argumentation, hence of
an epistemic relation, is the construction of more than one mental space
in which different inferences are valid. But what makes it look like
'concessivity in the content domain' is the fact that the background
causal inference in Space! relates lo the \vorld. The qualitative
difference between causal and concessive relations is that the former do
not necessarily lead to the construction of multiple spaces while the
latter do. It is the case of a causal relation within a single mental space
that provides the instances of pure 'content causality'. It is the parallel
case with two mental spaces representing distinct epistemic stances
towards the same causal relations that provides instances of apparent
'content concessivity'.
At the same time, the presence of two mental spaces makes even
such content concessives into cases of epistemic relations, and thus
parallel to epistemic causality. The point is that the actual use of an
epistemic causal relation, by Gricean principles, also involves the
construction of multiple spaces, in the following way. Recall that the
epistemic Interpretation of a causal relation or connective äs in (4),
repeated below, amounts to construing the second segment äs an
argument for the conclusion in the first:
(4) John worked hard, because he passed his exams.
Content causality, e.g. stating John passed his exams and then going on
to say how this came about {...because he worked hard) allows for the
first clause to be taken äs representing established knowledge, and the
second äs the only news. But when the second segment is an argument
äs in (4), then its being uttered would be beside the point, violating the
maxim of relevance, if the first clause was already taken to represent
undisputed knowledge at its being uttered: one does not provide support
for Information that one knows will remain unchallenged.
Consequently, if a Speaker provides an argument in the second clause
(i.e. produces a relation of epistemic causality), she projects a mental
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space with a non-positive epistemic stance (unlike her own) towards the
proposition expressed in the first clause:
Spacej
p: "John worked hard"
q: "He passed his exams"
Figure 3. Elementary Mental Space configuration for epistemic causality5
By the same reasoning, the content reading of the causal relation in (3)
does not involve the construction of another mental space representing
another epistemic stance:
(3) John passed his exams because he worked hard.
As has been observed frequently, the content reading provides only one
Statement, e.g. an answer to a single question of the type "Why?" or
"How?", and thus in a sense presupposes the proposition that John
passed his exams; this is what I called the "undisputed Information"
Interpretation of the first clause above. Thus in a content reading of p
because q the Speaker precisely does not project a mental space in
which the validity of p is not (completely) certain.6 We can now
formulate what it is that makes epistemic causality parallel to contrast
(including, in particular, concessiviry): the construction of two mental
spaces with distinct epistemic stances towards a proposition.
5.2. Epistemic concessivity
We have now provided an account, by using the mental space approach,
of the parallel between 'simple' concessivity and both content causality
(the inference in one mental space relates to real-world causality), and
epistemic causality (the Interpretation involves two mental spaces with
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distinct epistemic stances). The remaining question is how the apparent
'epistemic concessive' (6) fits in:
(6) John did not work hard, although he passed his exams.
What appears to be going on here is recursive mental space building. An
abductive causal reasoning process äs in Figure 3 is embedded in the
space representing the projected epistemic stance in Figure 2 (Spacei).
Since such a reasoning process itself involves two mental spaces, what
results is the constellation of mental spaces depicted in Figure 4:7
Space2 Spacei Space0
P
because q
(by abduction
although
p: "John worked hard"
q: "He passed his exams"
Figure 4. Mental Space configuration for 'epistemic concessivity'
That is, in uttering (6): John did not work hard ["not p" in Spaceo],
although he passed his exams ["q" in Spaceo], in particular through the
use of although, the conceptualizer projects another mental space
(Spacei), containing the abductive inference that John must have been
working hard ["p" in Spacei] because he passed his exams ["q" in
Spacei], and then invalidates this inference by denying its conclusion.
This analysis is corroborated by the fact that (6) allows for the following
explication: "Actually, the inference that John must have been working
hard considering that he passed his exams, is invalid: it is both true that
he passed [=second clause], and that he did not work hard [=first
clause]". The applicability of such a paraphrase is predicted on the basis
of the present analysis: since the mental space projected immediately
from the conceptualizer's space contains an instance of epistemic
causality, this space projects yet another mental space äs its background,
given our analysis of epistemic causality in the previous section.
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The parallel between epistemic causality and epistemic concessivity
is that both involve a mental space containing argumentation, which
therefore projects yet another mental space; the difference is that in the
latter case this constellation is the background of the conceptualizer's
space rather than that space itself. The constellation of the two leftmost
spaces in Figure 4 is identical to the one for epistemic causality depicted
in Figure 3, the two rightmost spaces in Figure 4 correspond to the
elementary constellation of concessivity in Figure 2. The parallel
between concessives in general and epistemic causality is that both
kinds of relationships involve more than one space with a difference in
epistemic stance towards a proposition.
It is the possibility of embedding spaces that allows us to
simultaneously account for differences and commonalities between the
pairs of sentences that we started out with. The mental space approach
thus provides a way to account for multiple levels of Interpretation
without multiplying levels in the theory: the same mechanism of
projecting a mental space from another one may sometimes be applied
recursively.
5.3. Concessivity and negated causality
I now want to show how the mental space approach also provides an
analysis of the connection between concessivity and negated causality,
i.e. the (partial) overlap between the wide-scope Interpretation of (1)
and the narrow-scope Interpretation of (2), repeated here for
convenience:
(1) The house is no less comfortable because U dispenses with air-
conditioning.
(2) The house is no less comfortable, although it dispenses with air-
conditioning.
What the relevant interpretations have in common is that an alternative
space is set up in which a causal inference "the house is less
comfortable" (q) is licensed on the basis of a topos of the type "Air-
conditioning normally makes a house more comfortable"; and that this
inference is invalidated in the conceptualizer's space, while it is true in
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both spaces that "the house dispenses with air-conditioning". The
mental space representation of this Interpretation is given in Figure 5:
Space0
p: "The house dispenses with air-conditioning"
q: "It is less conformtable"
Figure 5. Mental Space representation of (l)/(2)
It is now evident that the concessive Interpretation of (1) entails that the
element because marks a causal relationship in another mental space
than the conceptualizer's. The relations between the conceptual
structure of Figure 5 and linguistic material in (1) are äs indicated by
means of italicization in Figure 6:
Spacei
"t: {P-Q}
p: "The house dispenses with air-conditioning"
q: "It is less conformtable"
Figure 6. Mental Space representation of (1)
In the concessive interpretation, the causal conjunction must mark a
relation in another mental space than the conceptualizer's; the latter is
the one containing the denial of q, and the associated linguistic element
not. This explains why it is the so-called wide-scope interpretation of
negation that corresponds to the concessivity: in this interpretation, the
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because-relalion cannot hold in the same space äs the negation, thus it is
itself negated. Note, furthermore, that Figure 6 actually gives a more
accurate picture of the Interpretation than a one-dimensional formula for
wide scope negation of the type "not (q because p)", äs the latter does
not explicitly indicate that "not q" is actually asserted in the
conceptualizer's space.
Note that the Interpretation of the element because does not have to
be assigned to another mental space when it occurs in the context of
negation. But when it is interpreted äs belonging to the same mental
space äs not, then the same conceptualizer takes responsibility for the
negation and for the causal inference, and a so-called narrow scope
Interpretation is the result.
By itself the causal connective because does not indicate the
relevance of multiple viewpoints, but in a context of two mental spaces
it may apparently be used to mark causality in either one of these, äs
long äs the Overall interpretation of the utterance is not self-
contradictory. Another example of a causal connective demonstrating
this possibility is the following, from a Dutch newspaper text:
(9) De nieuwe tariefstmctuur is marktconform, maar daarom niet per
definitie klantvriendelijk.
'The new price structure is in accordance with market rules, but
therefore not by definition customer-friendly.'
The causal connective daarom ('therefore') evokes an inference from
being in accordance with market rules to being customer-friendly, and
since the latter is denied by the conceptualizer while the former is
acknowledged, the causal inference must be assigned to another mental
space than the conceptualizer's.
The conceptual structure represented in Figure 5 may also be marked
in other ways. As we have argued, a concessive connective like
although is itself an indication for projecting a mental space containing
a causal inference that is invalidated in the conceptualizer's space. That
is, the conceptual structure that is evoked by marking causality in a
projected space—äs in (1) and (9)—may also be evoked by a single
element that conventionally indicates this structure, i.e. a concessive
connective. As Figure 7 shows, the mental space configuration evoked
by although in (2) shares its structure with the constellatiön in Figure 6:
the same conceptual relationships (depicted in a general way in Figure
5) are realized in linguistically different ways.
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p: "The house dispenses with air-conditioning"
q: "It is less comfortable"
Figure 7. Mental Space representation of (2)
Thus, the connections between causality and concessivity that we
started this discussion with appear to fall out from the mechanisms of
Mental Space theory automatically.
What is more, it also follows from this approach that the relationship
is not one of complete duality, for a reason that may now appear very
simple. What would it amount to, in this view, to try to negate a
concessive relation? This would have to involve the projection of a
mental space containing both mental spaces involved in the concessive
relation, and their connections—not simply another mental space
projected from the space functioning äs the background to the
conceptualizer's one. In section 5.1, we claimed that the qualitative
difference between causal and concessive relations is that the former do
not necessarily lead to the construction of multiple spaces while the
latter do. And there is no way to get a single mental space constellation
äs in Figure l from the multiplication of mental spaces. On the contrary,
that way one can only get more and more complicated constellations;
recall that a sentence such äs (10) is virtually uninterpretable:
(10) ??/i is not the case that Johnfailed his exams although he worked
hard.
Interestingly, examples that have the same grammatical structure äs (10)
and that appear to fit the above characterization (a mental space that
contains both other spaces and their interconnections) are not at all hard
to find:
Causality in some other space 377
(11) Beatiefinds that although she has lost a lover she has gained her
freedom.
In fact, even a negation in the matrix clause of such constructions seems
to be possible in principle:
(12) They could not believe that although John had worked hard, he
failed his exams.
What seems to make this example so much better than (10) is the
factivity of the matrix predicate in (12); when I say X could not believe
that p, I am still committed to the truth of p myself, unlike when I say It
is not the case that p. Thus, in both (11), a non-negative sentence, and
(12), negative but factive, the embedded propositions are not
contradicted in the primary conceptualizer's mental space: in Spaceo,
there simply is no denial of "p although q". The problem with (10) on
this view is that it contains two instructions (not the case and although)
to set up mental spaces äs alternatives to the conceptualizer's, and that
these cannot be properly related to each other.
It is interesting to note that with a non-factive matrix predicate the
Interpretation of the entire sentence becomes unclear:
(13) ''They did not conclude/think that although John had worked
hard, he failed his exams.
When I say X did not think that p, my utterance may well be taken äs an
indication that I am at least uncertain about p myself, unlike the
Situation with factive predicates. Consequently, if the complement
clause contains a concessive one, this would be in the scope of the
'uncertainty operator' and the same problem of distinct spaces with a
non-positive epistemic stance would arise äs in (10). Whatever the
details of the analysis of these cases, they help to show clearly that the
problem with the Interpretation of a negation having a concessive clause
in its scope is a problem of manipulating points of view: when there are
several of them, it may be hard or even impossible to relate them to each
other in a consistent manner.
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6. Conclusion
In retrospect, the crucial problem in previous approaches to the
connection between causality and concessivity seems to lie in the
implicit single-viewpoint conception of negation, äs no more than the
reversal of truth value. This creates the illusion that two negations
cancel each other out, whereas in natural language and cognition
negation (also äs a part of concessivity) involves the construction and
manipulation of different viewpoints (cf, again, Ducrot 1996, and
earlier work), or in terms of the present framework: mental spaces. This
framework, motivated independently of the issue that concerned us here,
turns out to offer a prospect for a truly explanatory account. Since only
a very limited ränge of phenomena has been taken into account in this
paper, an important task is, of course, to test the approach against a
larger body of data. Yet I believe that it has proven worthwhile to spend
some space and energy on a mainly conceptual issue: what we
widerstand precisely when we call a phenomenon a case of 'concession'
or 'negated causality' crucially involves the manipulation of multiple
distinct though interconnected viewpoints; therefore it differs
qualitatively and irreversibly from the conceptualization of causality per
se, which need not demand the construction of more than one mental
space.
Notes
1. There is quite a variety of labels for this concept, such äs topos, (discourse)
presupposition, conventional implicature, defeasible implication. For some
analysts these are probably not the same, but the differences do not have to
concern us here. The term for this kind of "inference licensing rules" that I
will use myself later in this paper is "topos". It stems from Anscombre &
Ducrot's theory of argumentation in natural language, e.g. (1983, 1989). See
also Ducrot (1984, 1996).
2. Thus I am in füll agreement here with König and Siemund's emendation of
Pasch's analysis (cf. their section 4). What they fail to note, however, is that it
is not only a matter of descriptive adequacy that the 'background assumption'
involves some kind of generalization, but actually one of conceptual
necessity. As observed with respect to (8), this Schema (äs well äs the right
hand column of Table 2 in König and Siemund (this volume)) leads to a
straightforward contradiction, äs it entails both q and ^q. In order to avoid
this, only the propositions p and q themselves should be allowed to represent
particulars ("Singular Statements" in terms of Popper (1972)), thus allowing
for verification (cf. Popper 1972: 27, 33, and elsewhere); the background
Causality in some other space 379
assumption must be some general rule whose logical form does not allow for
verification. For similar reasons, the background assumption must be Only'
general and not universal; if it were truly universal, e.g. with q in the
presupposition taken äs "Vx(/(x))'\ the use of a concessive, asserting p&q,
would again entail a contradiction (p and ~p). These points have been
elaborated in other contexts before (cf., for example, Lagerwerf (1998) and
some references cited there), and especially in work in the tradition of
Anscombre and Ducrot's theory of argumentation in language. As Ducrot
(1996: 144) suggests, it might in fact be much older: "When we say ['It's
warm, let's go for a walk'], we do admit that there might be exceptions but
that does not prevent the topos from being valid, which is the point this highly
famous formula attributed to Aristotle makes: 'exceptions make it possible to
uphold the rule in unforeseen cases'.".
3. Precise terminology may be important here. Notice that what is to be avoided
is the attribution of contradictory beliefs. It is, of course, no problem to
entertain contradictory propositions. In fact, Mental Spaces is an explication
of what is involved in doing just that.
4. It should perhaps be pointed out that this description is not a füll semantic
analysis of a linguistic element such äs although (though it does provide
essential conceptual structure that will have to enter into such an analysis).
For example, this description does not yet provide a basis for distinguishing
between although and but, whereas the functions of these words are not
identical.
5. Abductive reasoning is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the
construction of multiple spaces: a deductive inference äs in may also be
construed äs an argument to take away doubt. In domain terms, and
informally: content causality may always be 'used äs' epistemic causality, but
the reverse does not hold.
6. This is a point, by the way, where I disagree with a specific polyphonic
analysis. It is sometimes proposed that such a distribution of old-new-
information should be analyzed in terms of two voices, one asking the
question ("Why?" or "How?"), the other providing the answer. In my view,
such a move threatens to destroy the usefulness of the concept, since it would
actually make it quite hard again to represent the difference between content
and epistemic causality.
7. In these and the following mental space representations of concessives, I will
leave out the connectors between the topos-representations (one obligatory
and one optional) in the different spaces, in order to make the pictures
somewhat simpler to read.
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